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Abstract
Irrigation and water supply systems are of vital importance for agriculture in many
regions worldwide, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. However, over-abstraction of
water and/or neglected maintenance are common problems faced by users and service
providers. The paper outlines a conceptual framework for a dynamic model for collec-
tive irrigation management. Furthermore a preliminary causal loop diagram for the
interaction of upstream- and downstream users is presented. The study builds on the
results of a workshop with local participants in Kyrgyzstan on sustainable regional
development and on the literature on collective resource management.
21 Introduction
Irrigation and water supply systems are of vital importance for agriculture in many
regions worldwide, especially in arid and semi-arid areas. Farmer-managed systems
have been shown to play a key role in irrigation (Vermillion 1998). Broad social an-
thropological evidence (Ostrom 1990, 1992; Lam 1998; Tang 1992) and theoretical
insights derived from game theory (Baland and Platteau 1996; Runge 1992) have
shown that collective property management can be considered as a rational and effi-
cient institutional arrangement. However, opportunistic behaviour is a permanent chal-
lenge to collective irrigation management. Moreover, due to the physical asymmetry
inherent in irrigation systems, users in the lower part of the system often complain
about not getting their water share.
Conditions and design principles for successful collective action have been developed
by several authors (Agrawal 2001; Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999; Ostrom 1992,
1992a, 1999; Wade 1988). However, as pointed out by Agrawal (2001) there is a clear
need for an integrated systemic approach with regard to collective action. This ap-
proach should take into account the heterogeneity of the users with regard to their in-
terest as well as with regard to their assets (Runge 1992, Baland and Platteau 1996).
Moreover it should be dynamic in order to reflect the dynamics of collective behaviour
itself and the impact of ongoing socio-economic trends.
In this paper1 we present a conceptual framework for a dynamic model on collective
action and a preliminary causal loop diagram for the interaction of head- and tail-users
in irrigation systems2.
2 Method
The research method used combines participatory interdisciplinary research, theory-
based conceptual work, and system dynamics modelling. In September 2005 a first
workshop was held in the Kyrgyz village of Saz to develop a system dynamics frame-
work for sustainable regional development. The participants of the workshop consisted
of local farmers and inhabitants from various social classes, representatives of admin-
istrative bodies at village and district level, representatives of NGOs and researchers.
The conceptual framework and the preliminary causal loop diagram for the interaction
of head- and tail-users are based on a review of the literature on collective action and
                                                      
1 The study presented here is part of a research programme conducted by the Swiss National Centre of
Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South. This programme aims at promoting sustainable develop-
ment and mitigating syndromes of global change in collaboration with local research institutions
http://www.nccr-north-south.unibe.ch
2 The terms ‘head- and tail-users’ normally utilised in irrigation literature are equivalent to ‘upstream- and
downstream-users’.
3irrigation management. Currently a dynamic model for collective irrigation manage-
ment is being elaborated, which will be validated and further developed in a follow-up
workshop in Kyrgyzstan in September 2006.
3 Problems and challenges3
The problem faced by farmers in Saz village – the sustainable management of irrigation
water – is typical for many rural societies depending to a high degree on natural re-
sources. The irrigation system in the village of Saz is composed of an upper part with
main canals under the responsibility of the District Water Management Department,
and a lower part with smaller distributary canals under the joint responsibility of the
village administration and farmers. Water is abstracted from the Sokoluk river and di-
rected through canals of different order towards the cultivated plots. Water fees have to
be paid to the district administration, which is supposed to maintain the main canals.
The fee covers only distribution services and maintenance, while water as such is (still)
a good for free. Currently efforts are being undertaken to establish a Water Users’ As-
sociation (WUA) in Saz, an endeavour that has not yet materialised.
Farmers in Saz are confronted with a variety of irrigation-related problems. High losses
of water occur on different levels within the transportation and distribution system. In
contrast to the general opinion of the farmers, research has demonstrated that the high-
est losses don’t occur in the upper part under the responsibility of the district, but
mainly in the lower part where both the village administration and the farmers are sup-
posed to be responsible for maintaining the infrastructure. The difference in loss can be
explained by two factors: (i) lower standard of the smaller distributary canals (earth
instead of concrete canals), and (ii) the different levels of organisation. At the time only
20-25% of the total water abstracted from the river reaches the end of the system. Of
the total loss of 75-80%, about 20% is lost on the upper (district) level and 55-60% are
lost on the lower (village and farm) level.
The main problems and challenges, however, relate to institutional and social aspects.
Due to a general distrust and dissatisfaction of many farmers with respect to the district
administration, many decided to no longer pay the water fee to the district. Instead they
agreed to elect a person responsible for the water distribution at community level called
murab. In Saz this role was entrusted to a woman, who has been in charge of this key
position for several years now. However, the financial transfers and the amount of wa-
ter distributed through the murab are not fully transparent: ’Only the murab knows’
was a clear open statement made by a farmer during the Saz Workshop 2005.
Despite the abundance of water, farmers at the tail end complained about getting insuf-
ficient water and also about not receiving it at the critical time needed. The general
                                                      
3 This section is based on the results of the workshop in Saz in 2005.
4payment behaviour of water users was openly discussed during the workshop. Partici-
pants widely agreed that about half of the farmers pay sporadically and/or only for part
of the water received. While one participant clearly stated that he would only pay if he
gets a sufficient amount of water at the right time and if the canals were kept in good
condition, others seemed to be too poor to be able to pay any fee at all. This payment
behaviour as expressed by the farmers is fully in line with research results obtained
during field studies. Further discussions revealed that in order to achieve a more fair
and equitable water distribution ethical and normative aspects had to be considered as




In the last decades broad empirical and theoretical research has been carried out with
regard to collective action and natural resource management. In order to develop an
appropriate conceptual framework it is worthwhile mentioning various perspectives
that may be adopted for the analysis of collective action with regard to the management
of natural resources: institutional analysis and development (IAD), new institutional
economy (NIE), participatory irrigation management (PIM), devolution of natural re-
source management, and game theory. Moreover, much research has been devoted to
the synthesis of the findings on collective action and resource management. Although
the overview presented here is not comprehensive it may provide a valuable starting
point for the discussion of the conceptual framework. The overview is focused on as-
pects of irrigation and collective management.
Institutional analysis and development (IAD) focuses on the institutional arrangements
on various levels, and the rules and incentives of the actors involved (Ostrom 1990);
three levels of institutional analysis with regard to irrigation are distinguished: opera-
tional rules that directly affect the day-to-day decisions made by users and suppliers;
collective-choice rules, which indirectly affect operational rules, used by irrigators,
their officials, or external authorities in making management policies; and constitu-
tional-choice rules determining (1) who is eligible to participate in the system and (2)
what specific rules will be used to craft the set of collective-choice rules. Institutional
analysis has been applied extensively to irrigation systems by Ostrom (1992), Tang
(1992), and Lam (1998).
New institutional economy (NIE) takes into account (i) the role of transaction costs and
relative prices promoting or hindering the evolution of new institutional arrangements
(e.g. the transition from common property to private property) and (ii) the dynamic
interaction between ideology, institutions, bargaining power, and organisations of
5groups of actors (North 1990; Ensminger 1992). The inherently systemic approach of
the NIE might provide an interesting starting point for a system dynamics model.
Participative irrigation management (PIM), irrigation management transfer (IMT), and
devolution of natural resource management is mainly inspired by the broad experience
that user-managed irrigation systems often outperform agency-managed systems.
Moreover the transfer of irrigation management from the state to user organisations is
heavily driven by the intention of the government to reduce or eliminate subsidies for
recurring costs of irrigation (Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999). Institutional arrange-
ments, capacity building, and social mobilisation play a principal role in this approach
(Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999, Ul Hassan and Nizameddinkhodjaeva 2003).
Game theory provides valuable insights in the variety of possible outcomes of situa-
tions where (groups of) players interact with each other (Baland and Platteau 1996).
Games may have different forms (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma, co-ordination game, assur-
ance game) involving players with homogeneous or heterogeneous payoff structures.
They may be played as one-shot games or repeatedly, with a small or large number of
players. With regard to natural resource management in villages it is important to note,
that situations, where the principle of reciprocity operates, are best characterised as
“assurance games”, not as prisoner’s dilemmas (Runge 1992).4 In assurance problems
villagers benefit not only when everyone cooperates but also when a critical mass co-
operates (Runge 1992, Baland and Platteau 1996). Thus a ‘bad’ and a ‘good’ equilib-
rium exist with threshold effects related to the critical mass of co-operating farmers.
To avoid falling into the ‘bad’ equilibrium, a subgroup of players may decide to un-
dertake the collective action in concert, regardless of what the others do. Here lies
an important rationale for leadership and the function of the leader consists of mo-
bilising a sufficient number of contributors rather than showing the good example as
assumed in the previous section [signalling to the other his intention to co-operate]
(Baland and Platteau 1996: 94).
Concepts of critical mass and thresholds in collective action have also been investi-
gated by Granovetter (1978) and Oliver et al (1985).
                                                      
4 It is worth mentioning here the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). Hardin’s analysis refers to open
access situations where no collective rules regulate the use of common resources. Therefore these situa-
tions can be described as Prisoner’s Dilemmas (although more realistically as repeated Prisoners Dilemmas
than by one-shot games). This perspective is not adopted here.
However, it has also to be noted that Hardin’s final conclusions (Hardin 1968: 1247) are remarkably close
to the findings derived by social-anthropological field research as he states that ‘‘the social arrangements
that produce responsibility are arrangements that create coercion of some sort’, and continues that ‘‘the
only kind of coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people
affected’ . This is fully consistent with the social-anthropological conclusions of Wade (1988) and Ostrom
(1990, 1992).
64.2 Conditions and design principles for successful collective action
Several authors present an overview of conditions or design principles for successful
collective action (Agrawal 2001; Meinzen-Dick and Knox 1999; Ostrom 1992, 1992a,
1999; Wade 1988). Ostrom (1992: 44) with reference to Wade (1988) and Uphoff et al.
(1990) summarises that motivation to engage in collaborative action on established
irrigation projects is highest
… where (1) farmers have long time-horizons, (2) they face sufficient scarcity that
they are motivated to invest in organising themselves, and (3) they are assured that
organisation could make a substantial difference in their yields.
While points (2) and (3) are also captured by a suggested curvilinear relationship (Tang
1992), point (1) needs more careful interpretation. Baland and Platteau (1999) note that
the structure of the users’ time preferences determines whether strategies, which yield
more immediate results or strategies aimed at resource conservation will be adopted.
These variations in time horizons are related to the distribution of wealth with two ex-
tremes leading to a discount of the value of the future income through the flows from
the common property resource. On one hand the low level of wealth of the poor may
not allow him/her to participate in collective action or to undertake conservation meas-
ures even though such actions would permanently increase future income. On the other
hand better-off households with access to outside economic opportunities tend also to
overexploit the resource as they anticipate a shift to alternative occupation and hence
don‘t have a long time horizon any longer. For very poor households this is a difficult
situation as they often most directly depend on the resource, hence should pay most
attention to conserve the resource. Moreover, their strong intention to minimise risks
might also motivate them to preserve the resource as much as possible. Hence, follow-
ing Baland and Platteau (1996) two opposite effects have to be considered: dependence
on the resource and level of resource base (economic capacity to invest in the long-term
conservation of the resource).
Thus the heterogeneity of the actors has to be considered carefully (Olsen 1965; Runge
1992; Baland and Platteau 1996, 1999). The distinction made by Baland and Platteau
(1996) and Agrawal (2001), which point to the difference between heterogeneity with
regard to endowments and with regard to interests, is of special importance. Whereas
heterogeneity in endowments and assets does not necessarily impede collective action -
it even may support collective management - heterogeneity of interests may cause rapid
(over-) exploitation of the common resource. This is due to the fact that some groups
(e.g. absentee owners) may have attractive exit strategies motivating them to exploit the
resource as quick and as much as possible.
Further parameters that determine farmers’ motivation for collective action are: reli-
ability of water supply, equity, and fair rules. ‘Fair’ rules are those where the benefits
gained and the costs (labour, financial input) are in an agreed balance (Ostrom 1992).
Mc Kean (1998) stresses the fact that distribution of decision-malting rights and use
rights to co-owners of the commons need not be egalitarian but must be viewed as
7‘fair’ (one in which the ratio of individual benefit to individual cost falls within a range
they see as acceptable).
It has also been pointed out that having a common history in collective action (either
with regard to irrigation or to other fields) supports further successful collective action.
This common history is also referred to as social capital (Ostrom 1999, Agrawal 2001).
4.3 Attitudes
According to Schiffman and Kanuk (1996) attitude can be defined as ’a learned predis-
position to behave in a consistently favourable or unfavourable way with respect to a
given object’. This definition emphasizes that attitudes persist across time and vary
only slowly. They can be viewed as a construct that precedes and determines behaviour
and thus guides choices and decisions for action.
The basic understanding of attitudes adopted for this study is demonstrated in Figure 1.
Attitudes guide the users’ actions, which consist in water abstraction, payment or non-
payment and (eventually collective) maintenance efforts. The outcome of these actions
- ultimately the amount of water farmers get compared to what they perceive as being
fair – feeds back to their attitudes and may change these over time according to modi-
fied experiences. Both processes influence each other finally leading to a modified
perception of what is considered as being a ‘fair’ share of water and a ‘fair’ payment











Figure 1: Feedback structure capturing the relations between attitudes, actions, perceptions, and the performance
of the irrigation system.
84.4 Scope of the model
Objectives
The objective of the model is to derive a framework for understanding the dynamics of
collective management in small irrigation systems taking into account (i) asymmetries
between head- and tail-users, (ii) feedback effects related to the performance of the
system, (iii) socio-economic stratification of the users (poor, medium, and rich farm-
ers), and (iv) diversification of income generating activities.
By means of this framework two questions will be addressed:
• What strategies improve the performance of irrigation systems?
• Does the envisaged Water Users’ Association (WUA) contribute to this im-
provement, and under what conditions?
Hypothesis
Although mechanisms for collective management being in place it is hypothesised that
the ongoing trend of diversification tends to further deteriorate the irrigation system. It
is further hypothesised that by strengthening enforcement mechanisms and by intro-
ducing transfer payments for poor households (from rich households and/or from gov-
ernment) this trend can be attenuated and eventually reversed.
Institutional level
The analysis mainly focuses on the level of operational rules, assuming that certain
institutional rules are in place. Hence it is neither attempted to model the change of
rules nor is the point of view of the NIE adopted here, although this approach shows
considerable common ground with system dynamics (Atkinson 2003). It is assumed
that collective action mechanisms are in place.
The question is therefore, how a commonly managed irrigation system will evolve over
time taking into account feedback mechanisms between the performance of the irriga-
tion system and the changing livelihood strategies. However, aspects of bargaining
power have to be kept in mind when determining the relationship between head- and
tail-users.
Terminology
According to the Dictionary of Sociology (Marshall 1998) ‘collective action’ is defined
as: ‘action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in
pursuit of members' perceived shared interests’. Opportunistic behaviour may consist
of free riding, rent seeking, and corruption or of combinations of these types of behav-
iour (Ostrom 1992). For the purpose of the model ‘opportunistic behaviour’ is consid-
ered to be free riding only. The other two aspects would require taking into considera-
tion a larger system boundary, which would be beyond the scope of the model.
9Model boundaries
In terms of space, the boundaries of the model are determined by the water supply sys-
tem of a village. The discrepancy between administrative boundaries and ‘natural’ (bio-
physical) boundaries given by the watershed itself, although happening quite often, are
neglected in the model. With regard to institutional arrangements the model focuses on
local decision-making and thus on operational rules. The model applies to the situation
of the village Saz in the Sokoluk river basin in Kyrgyzstan.
Time horizon
The time horizon of the model is 1995 to 2020. Starting in 1995 takes into account the
political disruption, which occurred in 1991 through the independence but avoids being
too close to the upheaval itself. Twenty-five years appears as a reasonable time-horizon
for irrigation infrastructure.
10
5 Results: Preliminary causal loop diagram
The basic causal loop diagram (Figure 2) proposed in this paper describes the interac-
tion between head- and tail-users. The socio-economic stratification and the diversifi-
cation of income strategies are not yet taken into account. The causal loop diagram
consists of ten loops that are described in the following section.
The behaviour of head- and tail-users is described by a word of mouth structure (R3,
R5) that captures the fact of critical mass and thresholds in collective action mentioned
above (Granovetter 1978, Oliver et al 1985, Runge 1992, Baland and Platteau 1996).































































The interaction between head- and tail-users is provided by three effects: (i) pressure is
exerted by tail-users in case of low perceived performance (B1) and/or a high degree of
internal organisation (R1); (ii) maintenance is effected or neglected depending on per-
ceived performance tail (R2) or on the level of collective action head (R7); and (iii)
water abstraction of head-users determines perceived performance tail (B3).
Pressure tail loop (B1) is a balancing loop describing the response of the head-enders to
increasing pressure of the tail-enders. The head-enders will behave more and more
collectively, reduce their water abstraction and increase their payment and maintenance
Figure 2: Feedback structure in an irrigation system with head- and tail-users.    
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share. This will increase the perceived performance of tail-enders. It has to be stated
though that this loop only works if head-enders have to concede the pressure of tail-
enders. Bichsel (2006) reports a situation in Kyrgyzstan, where tail-enders - though
being well organized - could not get their agreed share of water and instead of further
pursuing their claim dug a proper parallel canal beside the existing one.
Maintenance tail loop (R2) is a reinforcing loop describing the basic fact that the will-
ingness of the tail-enders to maintain the irrigation system depends on the water they
are allowed to abstract. Mc Kean (1998) points out that ’an important key to the cohe-
siveness of farmer-managed […] irrigation systems is the power of tail-enders to with-
hold their labour from maintenance of canals, channels, etc […] when they feel that
head-enders are taking too much water’. Unlike the tail-enders, who are in the weaker
position, the head-enders’ willingness to contribute their maintenance is assumed to
depend strongly on the level of collective action head (R7).
The effect of over-abstraction by the head-enders is captured by the water abstraction
head loop (B3), which results in a reduced perceived performance of the tail-enders.
Awareness tail loop (B2) refers to the notion of a fair share of water to be released by
the head-enders. As mentioned above the distribution of use rights need not to be
egalitarian but must be viewed as fair by the users. This fair share is denoted here as
expected performance of tail users. However, to know about the fair share requires
sufficient awareness, knowledge and information of the tail-enders about the irrigation
system, especially about the total water supply, the amount of irrigated land of head-
users and tail-users, as well as the maintenance and/or payment done by all the mem-
bers of the irrigation system. Liniger et al. (2005) reports the experience in the upper
Ewaso Ng’iro basin in Kenya, where the tail-enders began to exert pressure against the
head-enders only after they had recognized what the amount of the total water supply in
reality had been. They became aware that the water scarcity they experienced was not
due to climatic variation alone but mainly to upstream water abstraction.
Total water supply determines the performance experienced by tail- and head-users and
the amount of water that head-users potentially may abstract.
The word of mouth structure introduced above is incomplete in so far as it captures
only transitions from opportunistic towards collective action, but not vice versa. A
more comprehensive word of mouth structure that takes into account transitions in both
directions is presented below (Figure 3). In order to avoid a cluttered structure it has



























6 Discussion and outlook
The causal loop diagram presented here has to be considered as preliminary with regard
to the elements that have been taken into account. Important conditions for successful
collective action such as dependence on the resource, heterogeneity in interests and
assets and their change over time, socio-economic stratification and the effect of
changing income strategies have not yet been integrated. However, it facilitates the
discussion of basic processes related to irrigation and collective action and provides a
starting point for further modelling.
From a methodological point of view the research project has demonstrated that close
interplay of participatory research in the field and in depth study of available theoreti-
cal work is needed in order to derive a meaningful model concept. Through combined
efforts in field research and in modelling aimed on one hand at establishing a clear
understanding of the empirical context and on the other hand at providing a dynamic
synthesis a contribution towards an integrated view of collective action could be pro-
vided. In order to verify and enrich the understanding of the processes, it is planned to
hold a follow-up workshop with local participants and experts in Kyrgyzstan bearing
on the structure presented here. Furthermore the workshop is aimed at providing em-
pirical information about key variables identified in the model.
In order to investigate the dynamics of collective irrigation management it is envisaged
to develop a quantitative threshold model of collective action that refers to the proc-
esses elucidated in the causal loop diagram presented here. Further mechanisms that
have been enumerated above will be integrated and their dynamic implications will be
examined.
Figure 3: Word of mouth structure capturing transitions from opportunistic to collective action and vice versa.   
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